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Non-technical summary 
In 1997, a minimum wage has been introduced in the German roofing sector which has been 
regularly increased since then. As a result, the share of workers for whom the minimum wage 
is binding increased steadily. In eastern Germany, this binding rate reached 60% by the mid 
2000s, while workers in western Germany were less affected by the minimum wage. Against 
this background, the present paper investigates the effect of the minimum wage on competi-
tion in the roofing sector. Competition is measured by market entry, market exit and profits of 
firms active in the market. Our analysis is guided by the argument that the minimum wages 
may by used by established firms to raise rivals’ costs and prevent entry by potential competi-
tors. Lower entry rates reduce price competition and may stabilise or even raise profits of 
established firms. 
We analyse the effects of the minimum wage using a difference-in-differences framework, 
based on a firm panel data set that covers all firms in the roofing sector as well as in the 
plumbing sector -which serves as reference sector- from 1996 to 2010. Firm-level panel esti-
mations are employed to identify wage effects on profits while panel estimations at the level 
of regional markets are used to capture likely effects on entries and exits. As the binding rate 
of the minimum wage is significantly different between eastern and western Germany, all 
models are estimated separately for the two regions. In addition, firms are separated into two 
groups, sole traders (i.e. firms not affected by the minimum wage since they do not employ 
workers) and firms with employees (which do employ workers).  
Estimation results reveal that the minimum wage had no effects on competition in the roofing 
sector in western Germany while some evidence for the theory on raising rivals’ cost can be 
found for eastern Germany. In eastern Germany, both market entries and market exits of firms 
with employees were reduced by the minimum wage. At the same time, the minimum wage 
contributed to higher profits of established firms, obviously caused by the lower level of com-
petition due to lower entry and exit rates. Interestingly, the minimum wage clearly favoured 
market entries by sole traders in eastern Germany, which may point to some type of evasion 
strategy since almost all newly entering sole traders refrained from employing workers at a 
later stage. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Im Herbst 1997 wurde im deutschen Dachdeckerhandwerk ein bundeseinheitlicher Mindest-
lohn eingeführt, der seither schrittweise erhöht wurde. Insbesondere in Ostdeutschland nahm 
der Anteil der gewerblichen Beschäftigten, die vom Mindestlohn betroffen sind, über die Zeit 
deutlich zu und erreichte ab Mitte der 2000er Jahre Werte von etwa 60 %. Vor diesem Hin-
tergrund untersucht das Papier den Einfluss, den der Mindestlohn auf den Wettbewerb im 
Dachdeckergewerbe ausübt. Wettbewerb wird über Markteintritte, Marktaustritte sowie die 
Gewinne der im Markt aktiven Unternehmen abgebildet. Es wird die Hypothese untersucht, 
dass der Mindestlohn von den im Markt etablierten Unternehmen als ein Instrument genutzt 
wird, um die Kosten von potenziellen Markteintretern zu erhöhen und damit den Wettbewerb 
abzuschwächen. Dadurch kann der Mindestlohn zu einer Stabilisierung oder gar Erhöhung 
ihrer Gewinne beitragen. 
Die Untersuchung beruht auf einer Differenz-in-Differenzen-Schätzung der Mindestlohnef-
fekte auf die drei Wettbewerbsgrößen. Datengrundlage bildet ein Paneldatensatz, der alle 
wirtschaftsaktiven Dachdeckerunternehmen sowie Installationsunternehmen (die als Kon-
trollbranchen dienen) in Deutschland für den Zeitraum 1996 (d.h. ein Jahr vor Mindestlohn-
einführung) bis 2010 umfasst. Effekte des Mindestlohns werden auf Unternehmensebene in 
Bezug auf Unternehmensgewinne und auf Ebene von regionalen Absatzmärkten in Bezug auf 
Marktein- und -austritte geschätzt. Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Mindestlohnbetroffenheit 
werden mögliche Effekte getrennt für West- und für Ostdeutschland untersucht. Außerdem 
wird zwischen Einpersonenunternehmen (Selbstständigen) und Mehrpersonenunternehmen 
(die dem Mindestlohn unterworfen sind, da sie abhängig Beschäftigte haben) unterschieden. 
Die Schätzergebnisse zeigen für Westdeutschland keine Effekte des Mindestlohns auf dem 
Wettbewerb im Dachdeckerhandwerk. Für Ostdeutschland liegt dagegen Evidenz vor, dass 
der Mindestlohn sowohl zu einer geringeren Zahl an Markteintritten als auch einer geringeren 
Zahl von Marktaustritten von Mehrpersonenunternehmen geführt hat. Gleichzeitig trug der 
Mindestlohn zu einer Erhöhung der Gewinne von Mehrpersonenunternehmen im Osten bei. 
Im Gegenzug stiegen aufgrund des Mindestlohns die Markteintritte von Einpersonenunter-
nehmen in Ostdeutschland, was möglicherweise eine Ausweichstrategie widerspiegelt. Insge-
samt bestätigt sich die Hypothese, dass der Mindestlohn zu einer Verringerung der Wettbe-
werbsintensität unter den im Markt bereits etablierten Unternehmen beigetragen hat. 
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1 Introduction 
Most theoretical and empirical papers on the consequences of minimum wages consider 
employment effects. This is understandable, but introducing or raising minimum wages 
may also have quite different implications. As legislative intervention affects produc-
tion costs, the competitiveness of firms may be also altered. If the frequently supposed 
negative effects really are prevalent, less efficient firms may be forced to leave the mar-
ket and a larger part of the market may be served by foreign suppliers. This scenario 
need not necessarily become true if the companies in question make reasonable profits 
before the minimum wage has been introduced and the competitive pressure is not too 
tough. But even then it is quite possible that profits are reduced and employers suffer 
from this legislative action. It might be the case that the introduction of minimum wages 
implies winners and losers and it appears to be worthwhile investigating how producers 
are affected and whether they really are the losers if mandatory minimum wages are 
introduced.   
The discussion about possible effects of minimum wages on employment and firm com-
petitiveness is quite controversial. Basically there are two views. On the one hand, a 
standard supply and demand model with competitive market structure is applied and 
increasing labour costs will in this scenario reduce employment. Profits will also be 
negatively affected. On the other hand, there are many reasons why labour markets are 
not frictionless and workers are immobile. Information on job alternatives is imperfect, 
moving involves costs, workers have specific preferences for a job or an employer and 
finally workers are frequently quite specialized and cannot immediately find alternative 
employment opportunities.  
If a labour market can be described by monopsony, oligopsony or monopsonistic com-
petition, an increase in the minimum wage may induce more employment rather than 
less. However, the effects on profits would still be negative. Hence the effects of mini-
mum wages on employment and competitiveness may not go in the same direction and 
therefore a welfare-theoretic evaluation of minimum wages should also take into ac-
count the impact on capital owners.  
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We like to add a third view concerning the possible effects of minimum wages on com-
petition. The literature on the incentives to raise rivals’ costs emphasises (among other 
strategies) the advantages for some established firms of reaching an agreement with 
unions on generally binding wages in an industry. This may even be in their interest if 
their own wage costs rise, but the competitors are hit more intensively. The establish-
ment of minimum wages by the legislator may just work in the same direction. Hence it 
is possible that the introduction of minimum wages benefits some firms but proves to be 
a disadvantage to others.  
Of course, the performance of companies, industries or the whole economy is not an 
insignificant aspect of minimum wages. On the one hand, minimum wages might have 
opposing effects for workers and employers, and then the redistributive effects should at 
least be identified before any legislative action takes place. On the other hand, if profit-
ability is affected, the long-term effect of minimum wages on employment might differ 
from the short-term impact. The loss of competitiveness may well over time lead to the 
exit of the less efficient firms. Employment would then be reduced in the long run. 
Moreover, if the domestic industry is covered by a minimum wage but foreign firms are 
not, imports might rise (if the good is tradable) and the domestically produced goods 
would be substituted by the imported ones. Analysing the relation between minimum 
wages and competition is of value in itself, but is also - especially if long-term impacts 
are considered – relevant to employment. 
Increasing rivals’ costs through minimum wages can be particularly important if incum-
bents want to prevent market entries and thus reduce the degree of competition. Newly 
established firms often enter markets below the minimum efficiency size because of 
financial constraints (Audretsch 1995, Mata et al. 1995). As newcomers, they also suf-
fer from certain liabilities of newness such as low level of reputation vis-à-vis potential 
customers and low attractiveness for skilled workers. Young firms typically try to com-
pensate for these competitive disadvantages by operating at lower variable costs than 
incumbents do, including lower wages. Minimum wages can undermine this strategy 
and prevent potential entrants from market entry (Göddeke et al. 2011, Haucap et al. 
2001).  
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The role of minimum wages as an instrument to avoid competition has been discussed 
recently for the case of postal services in Germany. Heitzler and Wey (2010) argued 
that the introduction of a minimum wage in this sector at the end of 2007, shortly before 
a further deregulation step in the postal market in Germany, caused many firms to exit 
the market and deterred market entry. They stress that the minimum wage has been par-
ticularly effective in reducing competition because it increased not only marginal costs 
of labour, but also fixed costs, which has deterred the entry of firms that were more ef-
ficient than the incumbent.  
The case of postal services is certainly a specific one owing to the particular market 
regulation and the existence of a large incumbent which was a formerly a state-owned 
company and is believed to provide services below an efficiency level that would ap-
pear under full competition. The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of 
minimum wages on competition in a market that is characterised by many small firms 
that act under monopolistic competition and where a minimum wage increases marginal 
costs of labour only. Competition is measured through four indicators, the level of firm 
profitability, market entries, market exits and change in the stock of firms. In contrast to 
the case of postal services, we look at the long-term co impact of minimum wages on 
competition rather than the short-term effects of the introduction of a minimum wage.  
We use the German roofing sector as a case for which these characteristics apply. This 
sector is particularly interesting for various reasons. First, it has a long history of a min-
imum wage which was introduced in 1997 and has since then increased gradually. Sec-
ondly, in 2003 a uniform minimum wage across all regions was implemented despite 
significant differences in productivity and wages at a regional level, particularly be-
tween western and eastern Germany. Thirdly, the roofing sector is only one of a few 
sectors in construction services that are subject to a minimum wage while other con-
struction services that are faced with similar market developments and show a similar 
industry structure have no minimum wage. This provides us with a fortunate situation of 
having a proper control group against which we can evaluate minimum wage effects. 
Finally, supply in the roofing business is dominated by a large number of very small 
firms, including many sole traders. This allows an analysis of minimum wage effects on 
firms with and without wage labour. 
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Another interesting aspect is the geographical disparity of the share of workers for 
whom the minimum wage is actually binding. In the centre of our analysis is the effect 
of minimum wages on the economic situation of the affected firms and the impact on 
market structure. Though the minimum wage in the roofing sector applies to all roofing 
firms in Germany, regional economic conditions are quite dissimilar. In particular, there 
are significant differences between the performance of the roofing business in eastern 
Germany and the roofing business in  western Germany . As a consequence, wages also 
differ quite widely between the two regions, and therefore the effect of the minimum 
wage varies greatly between eastern and western Germany. Roofing firms predomi-
nantly employ qualified workers. In the western part, qualified workers usually earn 
more than the minimum wage, resulting in a negligible impact of the minimum wage in 
western Germany. The situation is very different in eastern Germany where most quali-
fied workers receive a wage close to or at the level of the minimum wage. This regional 
variation offers an opportunity to examine the impact of a minimum wage within the 
same industry. 
The empirical analysis rests on a difference-in-difference estimation approach, i.e. we 
observe competition in the roofing sector prior to and following the introduction of a 
minimum wage and use the plumbing sector as a control group. Using the Mannheim 
Enterprise Panel, we construct a unique panel data set for firms from both sectors con-
taining annual data on profitability, entries and exits for a period that runs from years 
prior to the minimum wage introduction in 1997 to 2010. The sample covers almost the 
entire firm population in both sectors. We analyse profitability at the level of individual 
firms and aggregate firm data to regional markets in order to analyse effects on entry, 
exit and the stock of firms. Due to data limitation, we have to refrain from a detailed 
analysis of minimum wage effects on prices but we do report some general findings on 
price effects that can be attributed to the minimum wage. 
The paper continues with some theoretical considerations on the link between minimum 
wages, prices, profitability and market entry and exit (Section 2), followed by a review 
of relevant empirical studies (Section 3). Section 4 provides background information on 
market structure and competition in the German roofing sector and Section 5 presents 
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the empirical strategy of our analysis. The data are described in Section 6 and the em-
pirical results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.  
2 Theoretical Considerations on Minimum Wage and Competition  
The Competitive Market Theory 
In the standard model of a competitive market firms are small, earn no economic profits 
and have no impact on the market-determined wage rate. Paying a higher wage would 
drive a company out of business and if it attempts to pay less than the market wage rate, 
vacancies could not be filled and the already employed workers would quit. 
In such a situation, the introduction of a binding minimum wage would affect all firms 
in the same way and lead to cost increases, higher prices and lower demand, and conse-
quently also to lower output. In the presence of fixed costs or efficiency differences (not 
implied by the standard model of a competitive market), some suppliers have to leave 
the market. Entry will be reduced.  
However, the negative impact of minimum wages on employment may be counteracted 
by some factors. Higher wages might lead to efficiency wage effects by stimulating em-
ployee motivation and then productivity would increase. Moreover firms may provide 
additional training and as the workers who are affected by the minimum wage are in 
most cases the unqualified ones, such initiatives will be quite valuable for their em-
ployment prospects, but also probably for productivity and firm performance. In addi-
tion the higher wages that have to be paid to any workers in the presence of a minimum 
wage may induce substitution effects. The employers may now look for better qualified 
and more experienced workers, who offer a better return for the increased wage in com-
parison to the ones employed prior to the introduction of the minimum wage. With a 
better qualified workforce product strategy might also be affected. The firms might now 
aim at products with higher quality. 
It is unclear whether the described counterstrategies are able to balance the cost in-
crease, but they probably contribute to a mitigation of the effects. Still, some or most 
firms will suffer from the less favourable production conditions. If the industry has 
made high profits before, the minimum wage may simply lead to redistributive effects 
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without affecting the number of employees and the number of firms. However, if the 
competitive situation was tough before the minimum wage was imposed, its negative 
effects might be stronger. Passing on the cost increases to custumers may be difficult in 
the presence of intense competition and substitution possibilities for the customers. Fur-
thermore, foreign producers might increase imports (in the case of tradable goods) if 
they now have a relative cost advantage. Then the less efficient firms in the industry in 
question may have to leave the market. In such a (negative) scenario we would observe 
reduced profitability, more exits and relatively few entries by domestic firms. 
The Monopsonistic Model 
The competitive model predicts lower employment if a minimum wage is imposed or 
raised and therefore also lower output is expected. Increased wage costs and lower out-
put imply in turn higher prices. Under monopsonistic competition, however, employ-
ment will rise or at least remain constant if the minimum wage is not set too high. This 
is because in a monopsonistic situation the marginal costs of hiring a worker are not 
equal to the wage rate. If the minimum wage is fixed at a level above the monopsonistic 
level, but below marginal costs of employing additional workers by a monopsonist, the 
now relevant marginal costs are below the former level. For some level of employment 
marginal costs remain constant and this leads to higher employment. As labour input 
and output are correlated, firms produce more. Then prices will fall in response to 
minimum wage changes. Hence the predictions of the two models are not only in con-
flict with respect to the employment effects but also with respect to output and prices.  
However, regardless of whether monopsony, oligopsony or monopsonistic competition 
is the relevant case on the labour market, producers suffer from the cost increases which 
are related to the introduction of minimum wages. If the product market is very com-
petitive the less productive firms may be forced to leave the market and the remaining 
firms will realize lower profits.  
The Raising Rivals’ Costs Theory 
The competitive market and the monopsonistic models are usually the theoretic founda-
tion of (the few) contributions on the impact of minimum wages on competitiveness. 
However, the effect could well go in the opposite direction.  
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Markets differ and so do competitive strategies. In some markets price is the strategic 
variable and low cost producers try to gain market share by underbidding other produc-
ers. This will probably be of relevance for entrants into a market with standardized 
products and availability of (low skilled) employees, who are prepared to work for a 
low wage.  
The literature concerning the strategies of “raising rivals’ costs” does not explicitly con-
sider minimum wages introduced by the legislator (with the exception of Heitzler and 
Wey 2010) but they do deal with a very similar issue, namely the imposition of wage 
rates which are generally binding for all firms active in an industry. Williamson (1968) 
discusses a court decision on an alleged conspiracy of a union with a group of employ-
ers with the aim of raising wage costs in competing firms to the level relevant for the 
allegedly conspiring firms. In his model firms produce with differing capital-labour 
intensities. Clearly, after the imposition of binding and relatively high wages, the labour 
intensive producers are disadvantaged. Williamson (1968) uses a standard limit pricing 
model to show that these firms cannot enter.  
Haucap, Pauly and Wey (1999) consider the case of domestic firms with different pro-
ductivities. Haucap, Pauly and Wey (2001) analyse the interest of employers’ associa-
tions and unions in generally binding wage agreements. Both the union and the employ-
ers’ association may have an incentive to increase the wage rate. This is because it may 
help to increase rivals’ costs, therefore limiting competitive pressure. However, the em-
ployers’ association may even prefer a higher wage than the union does and the union 
may enhance efficiency by limiting wage increases.  
The effect of the introduction of a generally binding minimum wage was investigated 
by Heitzler and Wey (2010). In contrast to Haucap et Al. (2001), they consider fixed 
rather than variable costs. Furthermore, they allow for efficiency advantages of poten-
tial entrants. They theoretically analyse the case where labour costs mainly comprise 
fixed operating costs and apply this scenario to mail delivery networks. A mail delivery 
service can only effectively enter a market if it offers full coverage of the relevant area 
by a network. This network is associated with fixed costs which are independent of the 
overall mail volume. This scenario is applied to the case of the Deutsche Post and the 
 8
introduction of minimum wages in postal services which may serve as a barrier to entry, 
even if the potential entrant is more efficient. 
Petrakis and Vlassis (2004) regard internationally integrated markets with productivity 
asymmetries. High productivity firms pay higher wages and still have lower unit costs 
than their inefficient rivals. Efficient firms have an incentive to opt for a wage floor 
high enough to raise their relative unit cost advantage and to increase their market 
share.  In the Petrakis and Vlassis (2004) model unit costs are strategic complements 
and raising rivals’ costs has a feedback effect to their own costs. However, the efficient 
firms gain more by reducing competition than they lose from the increase to their own 
costs. This strategy could also be applied to force the low performance producers to 
leave the industry and to discourage entry.  
In such a situation, minimum wages create a lower bound for labour costs and therefore 
limit the room for manoeuvre for firms which follow a low price strategy. The high-
wage suppliers may regard the introduction of a minimum wage as being “fair” because 
underbidding strategies are no longer possible1. The minimum wage works as a “raising 
rivals’ costs” strategy, but is induced by the legislator and not by incumbents. The pos-
sible advantages of firms with a low wage (low cost) strategy will no longer prevail. 
Some of these firms are no longer competitive and are forced to leave the market.  In 
addition, the minimum wage may discourage entry by challengers, who in the absence 
of minimum wages intended to underbid the incumbents. Less entry will further reduce 
competitive pressure and help to raise prices, therefore benefiting high-wage firms.  
To put it differently: Minimum wages lead to a convergence of production costs and 
therefore limit the opportunity for price competition based on production cost advan-
tages. Since price competition will affect profits of all firms in an industry negatively, 
minimum wages can help established firms to sustain a higher level of profits. Under a 
minimum wage regime, competition may rather shift towards quality differentiation, 
which is probably to the advantage of established high-wage firms. 
                                                 
1 See Manz (2012) for statements of practitioners supporting this view. 
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Summarising, the three theories lead to the following hypotheses on the impact of mini-
mum wages on competition (Table 1). The competitive market and the raising rivals’ 
cost theories suggest that firms will attempt to use price adjustments in order to pass on 
the cost increases to customers. If the competitive theory applies, it depends on the in-
tensity of competition in how far this is possible. The raising rivals’ costs theory in con-
trast implies less competitive pressure following the introduction of a minimum wage 
and price increases are then more easily realized than before. Only the monopsonistic 
model predicts lower prices as a reaction to the introduction or increase of minimum 
wages.   
Table 1: Hypotheses on the impact of minimum wages on competition 
 Competitive Market 
Theory 
Monopsony  
Theory 
Raising Rivals’ Costs 
Theory 
Profitability - - 
+ (high wage firms) 
- (low wage firms) 
Exits + + + 
Entry - - - 
Prices + - + 
 
3 Review of Empirical Results 
Not surprisingly research on the effects of minimum wages predominantly focuses on 
employment effects. Beside employment, prices are perhaps investigated most fre-
quently. Card and Krueger (1994, 1995) consider the fast-food industry but could not 
reach firm conclusions. Aaronsen (2001) considers price variation in the fast-food in-
dustry across U.S. states and finds an effect of minimum wages on prices with an elas-
ticity of about one. Aaronsen, French and MacDonald (2008) use establishment prices 
in the same industry and also find that cost increases are passed on to consumers. The 
latter study discusses extensively the differing implications of the competitive and the 
monopsonistic model. This comparison is also pursued in Aaaronson and French 
(2007).  
For the UK some studies on price effects can also be found. Bullock, Hughes and Wil-
kinson (2001) use questionnaire data from a survey concerning the possible effects of 
minimum wages and identify the likely consequences of it. 38 percent of all participat-
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ing firms report that price increases are a consequence of minimum wages. Based on 
data from an industry with many low paid employees before the national minimum 
wage was introduced, Machin, Manning and Rahman (2003) find no price effect in the 
care home industry. Draca, Machin and van Reenen (2005) also consider take-away 
food, restaurants and canteens and do not find much evidence in favour of price 
changes. Wadsworth (2008) uses the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Annual Sur-
vey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) to estimate the wage bill shares of minimum wages 
in each industrial sector for the UK.  This data is matched with sector-level data on re-
tail prices and Wadsworth (2008) then looks at price changes. He finds some evidence 
that firms which employ minimum-wage workers could have passed on parts of the 
higher labour costs to customers by increasing prices.  
Draca, Machin and van Reenen (2006) consider the impact of minimum wages on firm 
performance. They find evidence that firm profitability was significantly reduced by 
minimum wage introduction. However, no increased exit rates are estimated. They con-
clude that minimum wages simply redistribute quasi-rents towards low wage employ-
ees. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) find lower growth rates in employment and 
business creation if firms are exposed to minimum wages. Bullock, Hughes and Wilkin-
son (2001) report that as a result of the introduction of minimum wages 27 percent of all 
firms participating in their survey realize lower profits.  
4 Market Structure and Competition in the German Roofing Sector2 
The roofing business in Germany is highly regulated. As a general rule, a master crafts-
man’s diploma and registration in the local official register of handicrafts is required 
before a firm can offer roofing services, though there are exceptions for journeymen 
with sufficient business experience who may conduct the business as an itinerant trade 
(“sole traders”). In addition, other construction service firms may offer roofing services 
as an “insignificant auxiliary operation”, but this said to be a rare case. Substitutability 
                                                 
2 Information in this section rests on publicly available statistics, sector reports and a telephone survey of 
a random sample of 249 roofing firms as well as on a number of interviews conducted with roofing firms 
as well as with representatives of employer’s associations and unions, see Aretz et al. (2011) for more 
details and literature. 
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of roofing services by other suppliers is thus very limited. Since roofing services require 
special skills and equipment there is also little room for substitution through do-it-
yourself. Most roofing firms are engaged only in the roofing business, though some do 
offer related services such as construction plumbing or the de-humidification of build-
ings. 
In 2010, according to VAT statistics almost 14,000 firms were active in the German 
roofing sector. Most of them are small firms led by a master craftsman and typically 
employ a few people, but rarely more than 10 (including apprentices). In 2010, there 
were only 60 roofing firms in Germany with more than 50 employees, and just 7 with 
more than 100 (and not a single one with more than 200). An increasing number of 
roofing firms are sole traders. Over the past 15 years, their share has increased from 8.4 
percent in 1995 to 23.6 percent in 2010 (see Figure 1). The rise was particularly notice-
able in East Germany. The increasing share of sole traders contributed to a substantial 
growth in the total number of roofing firms which grew from 1995 to 2010 at an annual 
rate of 8.3 percent. 
Figure 1: Share of sole traders in the German roofing sector, 1995 to 2010 
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Source: LAK 
Production in the roofing sector is labour intensive. Opportunities for labour-saving 
technical progress are limited and mainly driven by producers of equipment (particu-
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larly material transport equipment) and roofing materials. Capital expenditure of roof-
ing firms are low, resulting in a low share of depreciation in total costs of just about 1 
percent. Since roofing firms typically organise roofing materials for their clients, the 
share of material costs tends to be high (60 percent). Labour costs represent about a 
third of total costs. Most employees - about 70 percent - are craftsmen or other skilled 
workers, and only a few percent are unskilled workers. In traditional trades, apprentice-
ship is very common, and apprentices represent up to ten percent of the workforce. 
Since roofing services have to be provided outdoors, production depends on weather 
conditions and often rests during winter time (December to March). 
Demand in the roofing market includes four main segments:  
- Roofs for new buildings for private clients, including loft conversion and similar 
construction work: this market is mostly served by local roofers. Price competition 
tends to take place through the quality of roofing materials used rather than through 
labour costs. While demand for new private housing has been declining since 2000, 
there has been an increase in roof conversion activities. 
- Roofs for new buildings for corporate or public clients: this market is mostly served 
by large roofing companies that act as subcontractors of construction companies. The 
market is highly competitive, and market volumes have been gradually declining 
since 1995 owing to falling investment in housing and industrial buildings in Ger-
many.  
- Repairs to roofs, including energy-efficient upgrades: this market is mostly served by 
local roofers and by sole traders. It is a fairly stable business, and demand has tended 
to increase in recent years since an increasing number of houses built after WWII re-
quire substantial repair. Public subsidies for upgrading energy-efficiency of build-
ings have further added to a growing demand for the modernisation of roofs and 
heating equipment in residential buildings. 
- Installation of solar collectors: this is an increasingly important market with high 
growth since 2005 due to generous public subsidies for the installation of solar col-
lectors. Roofers often serve as subcontractors or partners of electricians or plumbers.  
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Market development in the German roofing sector was characterised by a sharp decline 
in sales volumes during the second half of the 1990s and until 2004 (Figure 2). Sales 
fell from 1994 to 2004 by 31 percent. The East German roofing business was hit harder 
(-53 percent) than the West German one business (-22 percent). From 2005, demand 
recovered substantially, with significantly higher rates in the western part of the coun-
try. Along with falling demand, nominal prices remained almost stable from 1995 to 
2005 and have markedly increased since. Roofing prices for new buildings and for re-
pairs show a similar development. 
Figure 2: Sales volume and prices in the German roofing sector, 1994 to 2010 
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Source: Federal Statistical Office 
Competition in the roofing sector largely takes place within local markets between a 
limited number of firms. A telephone survey of a random sample of roofing firms re-
vealed that 66 percent do not have more than 10 competitors, suggesting fragmented 
and localised markets. Interviews with firms confirmed that most roofers act within the 
boundaries of local markets, often demarcated by the region of the regional guild. 77 
percent of the roofing firms surveyed report that quality is more important than price in 
their business, though price competition has recently been reinforced by the introduc-
tion of online tender databases. Competition by foreign suppliers is not relevant, except 
for a few border regions. Private customers, who represent roughly 60 percent of total 
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market volume, often enter into long-term business relations with local roofers. Price 
elasticity of private demand (with respect to the price for roofing labour) tends to be 
low since roofing services cannot be substituted by other related services nor can house 
owners dispense with building and maintaining a roof. Price elasticity tends to be higher 
with respect to roofing materials, which are a transitory cost item for roofing firms, 
however.  
In October 1997, a minimum wage for workers3 was introduced in the roofing sector in 
Germany, in a situation of declining demand and overcapacities following a multiannual 
boom in the German construction industry after reunification in 1990. Minimum wage 
introduction in the roofing business was part of a wider activity to introduce minimum 
wages in the construction industry which started in January 1997 with a minimum wage 
for the main construction trade. The minimum wage in the roofing sector initially ap-
plied different rates for West and East Germany, reflecting the diverging levels of pro-
ductivity and average wages (Figure 3). In 2003, a uniform minimum wage level for the 
entire country was introduced based on the previous West German level. There were 
three short periods between 1997 and 2004 when the minimum wage did not apply be-
cause of delays in negotiations between employer associations and unions over the fu-
ture level of the minimum wage. Continuation of the minimum wage was not chal-
lenged at any time during these interruption periods, however, meaning that behavioural 
adjustments of firms are very unlikely. From 2004 onwards, the minimum wage was 
steadily increased. Since 2007, minimum wages increase by 20 ct. steps per year, which 
is equivalent to an annual increase of about 2 percent, which is equal to the average 
inflation in Germany during this time. 
The minimum wage has been of limited relevance for West German roofing firms since 
most workers receive wages clearly above the minimum wage level. The share of work-
ers for whom the minimum was binding at the time of introduction was 3.9 percent. 
When comparing the labour cost increase due to the minimum wage with the total la-
bour costs of all West German roofing firms in 1997, minimum wage introduction 
                                                 
3 The minimum wage only applies for industrial workers and excludes salary earners and apprentices as 
well as self-employed persons. 
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caused higher labour costs of 0.15 percent. Over time, the significance of minimum 
wages in West Germany increased only slowly. In 2010, about 10 percent of workers in 
West German roofing firms received a wage level below or at the level of the next 
year’s (2011) minimum wage. The total labour cost increase in the West German roof-
ing business due to the minimum wage did not exceed 0.35 percent in any year.  
Figure 3: Minimum wage levels and share of workers bound by the minimum wage 
in the German roofing sector, 1997 to 2010 
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Note that the share of workers with binding minimum wages (MW) is calculated for June in each year. 
From September 2000 to August 2001, from September 2002 to February 2003, and from January to 
March 2004, no minimum wage applied. 
Source: LAK data. 
The situation is substantially different in East Germany. At the time of introduction, 12 
percent of workers in the East German roofing business received a wage below or at the 
minimum wage level. This share of workers with a binding minimum wage increased to 
more than 60 percent in 2007. The annual increase in total labour costs of East German 
roofing firms due to the introduction and gradual increase of the minimum wage was 
between 1.0 and 2.0 percent for most years since a uniform minimum wage is applied. 
Firms reacted upon the minimum wage through different strategies. Increasing prices 
was the preferred option both for West and East German firms, though it was more of-
ten used in the East (Table 2). Increasing productivity, reducing material costs and mak-
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ing more use of seasonal labour (which need not be employed during the colder season 
due to fewer orders) were further options used more frequently. The high share of firms 
that increased prices in response to higher labour costs caused by the minimum wage 
reveals that roofing firms have at least some room for passing on cost increases to cus-
tomers, which is most likely due to a low price elasticity of (private) demand and lim-
ited competition in local markets.  
Table 2: Strategies of German roofing firms to respond to minimum wages 
Percent of all firms that were affected by the minimum wage West East 
Increasing prices 33 55 
Increasing productivity 17 18 
Reducing material costs 17 6 
Using more seasonal labour 17 6 
Reducing overtime premiums 4 11 
Subcontracting to other firms 4 10 
Reduction of staff 0 12 
Increasing marginal employment 4 4 
Unpaid extra work 0 6 
Reducing hardship allowance 0 4 
Reducing costs for higher paid workers 0 2 
No response 4 0 
Multiple answers allowed. 
Source: Own survey (n=249). 
One should bear in mind, however, that annual cost increases due to the minimum wage 
are rather low even for firms that have a very high share of workers with a binding 
wage. The highest annual increase of the minimum wage was 4.7 percent in 2003 for 
East German firms when the East German minimum wage level was raised to the West 
German level, and about 2 percent in most other years. Since labour costs for workers 
represent only about a quarter of total costs of roofing services when material costs are 
included, total cost increase due to the minimum wage was limited. In addition, in the 
largest market segment of roofing services, roofs for new buildings, roofers supply only 
a sub-product of the entire product (the building), and costs for building the roof are 
only a minor part of total costs. More important, however, is the accumulative effect of 
the minimum wage if the minimum wage is constantly higher than the productivity of 
workers with a binding minimum wage. If productivity or workers cannot be increased 
accordingly, firms will face an increasing gap between labour costs and labour produc-
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tivity, which can be particularly harmful for newly founded firms with a low initial 
level of productivity due to inefficient firm size and lack of experience. 
5 Empirical Strategy: Difference-in-Differences 
In line with many other empirical studies we apply a difference-in-differences method-
ology to identify the causal effects of the minimum wage on competition in the German 
roofing sector. This requires the availability of panel data as the basic idea of differ-
ence-in-differences for the identification of any effect is a before-after comparison. It is 
necessary to have information available on firms which are affected by the policy 
change (treatment group) and a comparison set of firms for which the policy measure 
has no impact (control group).  
The treatment group consists of firms in the roofing sector. Since roofing firms may be 
treated by the minimum wage to different extents, depending on the share of workers 
for which the minimum wage is binding, we use indicators on the degree to which a 
roofing firm is affected by the minimum wage to control for treatment heterogeneity.  
The control group has to consist of firms from an industry which is not covered by a 
minimum wage and which shares key features with the roofing business. In principle 
the control group should be as similar as possible to the treatment group, expect for the 
treatment (Meyer 1995). Obviously this requirement is difficult to fulfil since there are 
no two identical sectors. A somewhat weaker assumption is that in the absence of treat-
ment the difference between the two groups would remain constant over time or, put 
differently, without treatment the time trends are parallel for both groups. This would 
require that the control group shows similar market structure and demand conditions. 
Furthermore the composition of the two groups should not change during the pre-
treatment period in a way that the outcome variables were affected4 (e.g. firms antici-
pating the introduction of minimum wages react by increasing skill requirement for 
workers, dismissing the workers with the lowest productivity or by leaving the region or 
the industry altogether). 
                                                 
4 Cf. for example Blundell et al. (2004).  
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As the roofing sector is part of the construction service industry, other construction ser-
vices are obvious candidates for serving as a control group. Luckily for our investiga-
tion, two construction service sectors in Germany do not apply minimum wages, 
namely the plumbing sector (plumbing, heating and air-conditioning installation) and 
the glazing sector. Analysing structural characteristics or production (capital intensity, 
wage level, share of labour costs, average firm size, labour productivity) and demand 
(change in sector sales prior to October 1997, market size per firm, average number of 
competitors) reveals that the plumbing and the roofing sectors are much alike in all fea-
tures while glazing firms differ considerably (see Aretz et al. 2011 for more detail).  
Figure 4: Sales in the German roofing sector, 1994 to 2008, compared to the 
plumbing and glazing sectors and main construction trade 
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Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
Both in the roofing and the plumbing sector, competition takes place within rather nar-
rowly confined regional markets, and both require a master craftsman’s diploma to sup-
ply services. In addition, the plumbing sector shares some peculiar market trends with 
roofers, particularly with respect to the role of solar collector installation as a driver of 
demand in recent years. Since most solar collectors on private houses are used for water 
heating, plumbers and roofers often work hand in hand for the same clients. The devel-
opment of sales ran quite similarly in both sectors prior to the first full year of the mini-
mum wage (1998), except for 1994/95 in East Germany while glaziers showed a sig-
nificantly different development of demand, as did the main construction trade (Figure 
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4). At the same time, the essential assumption of an absence of control group contami-
nation (i.e. that there are no indirect effects of the minimum wage in the roofing sector 
on the plumbing sector) holds since both services are not substitutable and there are 
virtually no firms that offer both services. 
We evaluate the impact of the minimum wage on competition in the roofing sector by 
both comparing the situation prior to minimum wage introduction in October 1997 to 
the situation afterwards and comparing the development in the treatment group, i.e. the 
roofing sector with the development in the control group, i.e. the plumbing sector. In the 
standard difference-in-difference approach, the before-after comparison is made twice, 
and the outcome variable y is compared as a difference between the two groups: 
 
2 1 2 1_ _ _ _
( ) ( )
time time time time
T T C Cy y y y
   
     (1) 
The sample averages 
_
iy for the variable of interest y  of the two groups, treatment T 
and control C, are identified and then differences with respect to the variable of interest 
are computed. The difference-in-differences method removes permanent differences 
between groups and at the same time common trends.  
In practice the difference-in-differences estimator is frequently realised by applying a 
simple regression:  
 yit =  + 0 dt + 1 Bit +  dt*Bit + 2 Zit + it (2) 
The outcome variable for observation i in year t is again denoted by y , the dummy 
variable B  takes unit value if an observation is part of the treatment group (roofing 
sector), and d  identifies the event of the policy change (introduction and increase of the 
minimum wage, respectively). The coefficient  captures possible differences between 
the treatment and the control group before the policy change. The coefficient 0 cap-
tures time effects relevant to the period after the policy change has been implemented 
and 1 captures structural differences between the treatment and the control group inde-
pendent from the policy measure. The coefficient  is the key variable of interest since 
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it captures the effect of the policy measure on the outcome variable. Vector Z represents 
a set of control variables that may affect y.  
An essential issue of evaluating the impacts of the minimum wage on competition in the 
roofing sector is to go beyond the mere effects of the minimum wage introduction in 
1997. Following the raising rivals’ cost hypotheses, a minimum wage would not only 
affect profitability, entry and exit at the time of introduction, but also in consecutive 
periods. This is particularly true if the minimum wage increases over time and grows 
faster than labour productivity. In such a case, potential negative impacts of the mini-
mum wage on less competitive firms and potential entrants will increase over time, and 
so will the impact on competition. In addition, the treatment effects of the minimum 
wage will vary among firms according to their wage level prior to minimum wage in-
troduction and prior to a further increase of the minimum wage.  
We make account for dynamic and firm-specific effects of the minimum wage by alter-
ing (2) by introducing an observation- and time-specific measure of policy change, x: 
 yit = 0 + 0dt + 1Bit + 1xit(dt)*Bit + 2Zit + it (2a) 
In our empirical study we use two different definitions for observation i. For the out-
come variable profitability, observation i represents an individual firm while the out-
come variables market entry, market exit and stock of firms are analysed for regional 
markets, i.e. observation i represents a region. Regional markets are used because both 
the roofing and the plumbing market are regionally segmented, and competition takes 
place within spatially limited areas, which is most often the area of the regional guild. 
The boundaries of both roofing and plumbing guilds are identical.  
6 Data 
For estimating (2a), we need data on our outcome variables on competition (firm profit-
ability, market entry, market exit, stock of firms), the extent to which a firm or region is 
affected by the minimum wage, and control variables that may influence outcome vari-
ables and are independent of the minimum wage for both sectors over a time period that 
runs from before the minimum wage introduction to the most recent year available. We 
combine different data sources to measure our model variables. 
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Outcome variables on competition are taken from the Mannheim Enterprise Panel 
(MEP), which is a firm panel database produced by the Centre for European Economic 
Research based on information from Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating 
agency. The MEP covers virtually all firms in Germany that are commercially active, 
which means that firms show some level of production or sales activity, including sole 
traders. The MEP contains, among other things, annual information on the number of 
employees and the credit rating of firms. In addition, industry codes, a text description 
of a firm’s commercial activity and the formal skill level of firm founders are known as 
well as the date of the firm’s foundation and its location. In addition, both voluntary and 
forced firm closure can be identified. MEP data are used to establish an annual panel 
data set of roofing and plumbing firms in Germany that spans the time from 1995 to 
2010. Roofing and plumbing firms are identified by industry codes (NACE rev. 2.0 sub-
class 43.91.1 for roofers, 43.22.0 for plumbers). Comparing the number of active firms 
per year in our panel with VAT data (number of firms that pay VAT, which excludes 
firms with sales of less than €17,500) shows that the MEP covers 100 to 105 percent of 
VAT-registered roofing firms and of 114 to 121 for VAT-registered plumbing firms 
until the year 2004, and that coverage rates have been falling ever since (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Coverage of VAT-registered firms in the MEP in the roofing and plumb-
ing sectors, 1995 to 2010 
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A coverage rate of more than 100 percent indicates that the MEP contains a number of 
sole traders that report very small sales figures of less than €17,500 per year to the tax 
office and are thus not covered in VAT statistics. There are obviously more such firms 
in the plumbing than in the roofing sector. The falling coverage rates from 2005 on re-
flect a time lag in recording newly founded firms, particularly sole traders, by Creditre-
form. This time lag applies to all sectors equally, and there is no reason why this time 
lag should differ between the roofing and the plumbing sector. The slightly increasing 
coverage rates from 1995 to 1999 are due to slightly incomplete coverage of firms 
founded before 1989 and closed between 1995 and 1998 due to incomplete data trans-
mission at this time, which again concerns all sectors equally and is not biased between 
the two sectors considered. 
The firm panel data set is used for estimating minimum wage effects on profitability. 
Profitability is measured by the credit rating given by Creditreform for each firm. 
Creditreform uses different information for its ratings, including financial and liquidity 
risks and structural risks such as industry classification, firm age, firm size and produc-
tivity, along with “soft factors” such as payment history, volume of orders, firm devel-
opment or management quality (see Czarnitzki and Kraft 2007). On the basis of these 
individual facts Creditreform calculates a rating index ranging from 100 points to a 
maximum of 600 points. The worst firms receive 600 points and the best ones have 100 
points. We transfer this rating into an ordinal variable with nine classes so that the num-
ber of observations by class is similar in size. The credit rating basically provides in-
formation about the short-term solvency of a firm, which is highly correlated to its cur-
rent profitability situation. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004, 2007) demonstrated that credit 
ratings are valuable information with respect to a firm’s financial performance. 
The firm panel data set is further used to calculate our other three competition variables, 
the number of market entries (this is the number of roofing and plumbing firms that 
were founded in a certain year), and market exits (this is the number of firms that were 
closed in a certain year) as well as the number of active firms (this is the number of 
firms that offered roofing or plumbing services during a certain year, including firms 
founded and closed during the same year). All three variables are measured for regional 
markets. We use administrative districts (Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte) to define 
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regional markets. Districts often match one to one with the area of regional guilds, 
though in some Federal States guilds cover more than one district. There are 413 differ-
ent districts, compared to 319 different regional guilds in Germany. The average num-
ber of roofing firms (excluding sole traders) per district is 26, which is somewhat more 
than the mean of the number of competitors as reported by roofing firms (17), which 
indicates that districts may either be too large in some cases to represent actual regional 
markets or that there is some type of market segmentation among roofing firms within 
regional markets (e.g. between firms that specialise in new buildings and roof conver-
sion and others that are engaged in repair only). 
The extent to which a firm or region is affected by the minimum wage is measured by 
the ‘binding ratio’. The binding ratio in year t gives the proportion of workers at time t-
1 that are paid less than the minimum wage at time t: 
 BINit = j Ljit-1(Wjit-1<=Wjtmin) / j Ljit-1 (3) 
with Ljit-1 being the number of workers j in observation i at time t-1, Wjit-1 wage of 
worker j in observation i at time t-1 and Wjtmin the minimum wage for the relevant 
worker j at time t.  
We also considered an alternative measure of the significance of the minimum wage for 
a firm, the so-called wage gap. This indicator measures the change in total wage costs 
due to the minimum wage introduction or increase. Though the financial burden is ex-
pected to determine the extent of a firm’s reaction, if many or even all workers initially 
paid less than the minimum wage are dismissed, the wage gap would be zero, but obvi-
ously the minimum wage has had a strong effect. In addition, the wage gap does not 
represent accumulative effects of the minimum wage on costs which can be particularly 
important for competition impacts. In contrast, the binding rate is always defined in 
relation to the situation before the minimum wage was introduced for the first time, 
when the binding rate was zero. Hence the effect of an increase of the minimum wage is 
not measured just in comparison to the situation in the previous period since workers 
paid below the minimum wage during the period before the minimum wage was intro-
duced would still earn less than the minimum wage in later periods, especially in cases 
where the minimum wage is increased. We prefer the binding ratio over the wage gap as 
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minimum wage indicator since it represents the total burden of the existence of a mini-
mum wage for a firm. This is probably the more appropriate measure if profitability, 
exit and entry are considered.   
Data on the binding rate are taken from the central pay office of the roofing sector  
(Lohnausgleichskasse, LAK). This database contains all roofing firms that employ blue-
collar workers. Data protection regulation impedes a merge of this data with MEP data, 
however. We therefore follow the approach by Stewart (2003) as well as Galindo-Rueda 
and Pereira (2004) and make use of the regional variation and size class variation in the 
exposure to the minimum wage. We calculate the average of all firms in a regional mar-
ket and a certain size class (up to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 20 and more than 20 employees) and 
merge  this indicator with firm data based on a firm’s location and size. This approach 
ensures that minimum wage indicators are also assigned to sole traders and other firms 
in the roofing sector without blue-collar workers (for whom the minimum wage applies) 
which is a prerequisite to analyse minimum wage effects on this group of firms. For 
details on the calculation of the binding ratio and the wage gap, see Aretz et al. (2011). 
In addition, we use a number of control variables that may have an influence on our 
competition variables. These include firm characteristics, input prices, demand charac-
teristics and market structure characteristics. We use four variables to control for firm 
heterogeneity: size, age, legal status and qualification of firm owners. Size is measured 
by the number of persons working in a firm, including both employed and firm owners 
(thus size equals 1 for sole traders). Age is the number of years since firm foundation. 
Both age and size have been found to have a significant effect on the survival of en-
trants (Geroski 1995). Size and age way also affect profitability positively (Czarnitzki 
and Kraft (2004). Legal status is measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
owners assume full liability. Qualification of firm owners refers to the highest qualifica-
tion level in terms of university degree, master craftsman’s diploma or journeyman’s 
certificate and is measured through three dummy variables. All firm-specific variables 
are taken from the MEP. 
The development of input prices can affect profitability as well as market exit if prices 
for materials change considerably and unexpectedly, and challenge initial calculation 
bases. Since all material inputs used by roofing and plumbing firms are procured from 
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other sectors than the roofing sector, no minimum wage effects on material input prices 
can occur. Input price development is taken from the statistics on producer prices for 
building materials which is published by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). We use 
the average index for six main roofing and plumbing inputs, respectively (weighted by 
the approximate input share of each material).  
Demand for roofing and plumbing services is approximated by three indicators, the 
number of new building permits for both private and commercial buildings, the average 
age of buildings and the square meters of newly installed solar panels on roofs. Demand 
variables are standard explanatory variables in models explaining profitability (Martin 
2003, Ch. 6). Entry rates are also affected by market growth (Siegfried and Evans 
1994). All three demand variables are measured at the level of regional markets, i.e. 
districts. The number of new building permits is taken from building statistics of the 
FSO and is used to represent the demand segment for new roofs. We relate this figure to 
the production capacity in the region to control for the size of the region. Production 
capacity is approximated by the employment in the roofing and plumbing sector, re-
spectively, including self-employed persons and is calculated from MEP data. The av-
erage age of buildings is a proxy for the repair and energy-efficient upgrade demand 
segment since older buildings are more likely to need repair and upgrade. The data 
come from a special tabulation of the Micro Census of the FSO for two years (1998 and 
2006). Since building age is available for four age classes only, we calculate an index 
that weighs buildings erected prior to 1949 with 2, buildings erected between 1949 and 
1978 with 1, buildings erected between 1979 and 1990 with 0.5 and buildings erected 
1991 or later with 0.25 to represent the varying demand for repair. Values for all other 
years than 1998 and 2006 are interpolated or extrapolated. Data on newly installed solar 
panels on roofs were provided by the Research Center for Energy Economics (FFE). 
The square meters of installed solar panels are adjusted for the size of the region by 
relating the figure to the production capacity in the region. All demand variables enter 
the model as rates of change since we assume it is the change in demand that affects 
competition, rather than the level. 
Market structure may affect profitability as well as market entries and exits. We use a 
firm’s market share to control for likely market power effects on profitability. Market 
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share plays a very prominent role in empirical research on profitability (Schmalensee 
1985, Martin 2002, ch. 6). A high market share may reflect efficiency advantages (effi-
cient firms tend to grow at the expense of their rivals and tend to be more profitable at 
the same time), but the market share is also a determinant of price-cost margins in oli-
gopoly models (see for examples Motta 2004, ch. 3.3.1.6). Market share is measured by 
the share of the number of persons working in firm i in total regional employment in the 
respective sector. In the regional models, the average market share of firms is used to 
control for concentration effects on entry and exit. As mentioned before, the relevant 
market for roofers is in most cases a geographically narrowly defined area5. The dis-
tance of a firm to its nearest competitor informs about the significance of monopsonistic 
competition in the labour market and a likely regional monopoly in the product market. 
Firm-specific distance to the nearest competitor is calculated based on distances be-
tween ZIP areas. If a firm has a competitor in the same ZIP area, distance is zero. In 
addition, we use lagged entry rates in the regional market for the models on profitability 
to control for corresponding effects of firm closure on the performance of the remaining 
firms. However, the literature on entries reports only limited effects on profitability 
(Geroski 1995). In the entry and exit models, lagged exit and entry rates are used to 
represent “revolving door” effects (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2007), i.e. the incentive to 
enter a market and try to capture the former market share of the exiting firm and the 
increased competition by entries that may increase the probability of market exit among 
the newly founded or the established firms.  
For the estimations at regional level, we use regional averages of firm size, firm age, 
market share and distance to nearest competitor to control for heterogeneity in the re-
gional firm population and corresponding effects on entry, exit and the change in the 
stock of firms. 
                                                 
5 For a general discussion about the relevant market see Motta (2004, ch.3). 
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Table 3: Definition, data source and descriptive statistics of model variables 
Variable  Definition Source Firm-level data Regional data 
   Mean Std. D. Min. Max. Mean Std. D. Min. Max. 
Profitability Credit rating, 9 classes (the higher, the better) MEP 4.86 2.29 0 8 - - - - 
Entry rate sole 
traders 
No. of newly founded sole traders per stock of sole trader firms, district 
level 
MEP - - - - 0.0154 0.026 0 0.5 
Entry rate non-
sole traders 
No. of newly founded non-sole traders per stock of non-sole trader 
firms, district level 
MEP - - - - 0.0300 0.041 0 1 
Exit rate sole 
traders 
No. of sole traders closing per stock of sole trader firms, district level MEP - - - - 0.0026 0.010 0 0.33 
Exit rate non-
sole traders 
No. of non-sole traders closing per stock of non-sole trader firms, district 
level 
MEP - - - - 0.0396 0.044 0 1 
Change in stock 
of sole traders 
Change in the no. of active sole trader firms over the previous year, 
district level 
MEP 0.0433 0.165 -1.886 2.109 0.0576 0.249 -1.886 2.109 
Change in stock 
of non-sole 
traders 
Change in the no. of active non-sole trader firms over the previous year, 
district level 
MEP -0.0183 0.047 -1.099 1.099 -0.009 0.084 -1.098 1.609 
Binding rate Share of workers with a wage below the minimum wage in the following 
year  
LAK 0.0295 0.112 0 1 0.0691 0.145 0 0.845 
Firm size No. of persons employed, logarithm MEP 0.0775 0.403 -3.99 35.88 6.680 3.442 0 70.51 
Firm age No. of years since foundation, logarithm MEP 2.420 1.16 -0.69 6.71 2.447 0.380 0 4.06 
Unlimited  1 if the firm is a private company, 0 otherwise MEP 0.674 0.469 0 1 - - - - 
Graduate 1 if at least one owner has a university degree, 0 otherwise MEP 0.040 0.197 0 1 - - - - 
Master crafts-
man 
1 if at least one owner has a master craftsman’s diploma but no one a 
university degree, 0 otherwise 
MEP 0.528 0.499 0 1 - - - - 
Journeyman 1 if at least one owner has journeyman’s certificate but no one has a 
university degree or a master craftsman’s diploma, 0 otherwise 
MEP 0.114 0.318 0 1 - - - - 
Input prices Change in price index of roofing/plumbing materials FSO 0.030 0.040 -0.029 0.137 0.0191 0.0342 -0.030 0.137 
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Table 3: Continued 
Change in build-
ing permits 
Change in no. of permits for new buildings per production capacity (no. 
of persons employed in the roofing/plumbing sector), district level 
FSO -0.044 0.174 -3.50 3.57 -0.054 0.255 -1.16 3.75 
Building age Average age of buildings weighted by repair need, district level FSO 3.183 3.40 0 13.82 - - - - 
Change in build-
ing age 
Year-to-year change in average age of buildings weighted by repair 
need, district level 
     0.0040 0.0054 -0.009 0.024 
Solar demand m2 of newly installed solar panels on roofs per production capacity, 
logarithm, district level 
FFE 0.0012 0.003 -0.008 0.010 - - - - 
Change in solar 
demand 
Year-to-year change in m2 of newly installed solar panels on roofs per 
production capacity, district level 
FFE - - - - 0.598 1.786 -11.35 12.18 
Market share Share of firm's employment in total roofing/plumbing employment in the 
district 
MEP 0.0120 0.032 0.0001 1 0.1813 0.1624 0.0112 1 
Distance to 
competitor 
Distance in km to nearest competitor based on ZIP areas (0 if >0 com-
petitors in the same ZIP area)  
MEP 0.1763 1.027 0 43.49 0.781 1.575 0 21.81 
Roofing firm 1 if the firm is from the roofing sector, 0 otherwise MEP 0.188 0.390 0 1 0.5 0.5 0 1 
 
 29
Table 3 summarises the definition of the model variables used and shows descriptive 
statistics for the firm-specific and regional data. 
7 Econometric Estimation and Empirical Results 
The type of measurement of our outcome variables requires different econometric ap-
proaches. Profitability is measured as an ordinal variable with nine classes which sug-
gests the use of an ordered Probit modelling approach. Entry and exit rates are continu-
ous variables, but for many regions there are zero exits and entries in some years. 
Across the entire sample of 413 regions and 15 years the share of zero observations is 
27.0 percent for entries and 30.5 percent for exits. We employ a Tobit model to capture 
this data structure. The change of the stock of firms is a continuous and normally dis-
tributed variable and makes an OLS the model of choice. 
Both the firm-level and the regional models are clustered by 97 planning regions which 
tend to represent labour market regions as well as the largest geographical reach that 
may be served by roofing and plumbing firms, though many firms confine their supply 
to more narrow regional markets. By introducing regional dummies, we try to control 
for likely spatial autocorrelation effects of demand, market structure in product markets 
and labour markets of bordering regions. In addition, all models include time dummies 
that capture, among others, business cycle effects as well as effects of varying coverage 
of entries, exits and the stock of firms by year in the sample we use.  
All models are estimated separately for East and West Germany and for sole traders and 
non-sole traders. Separate models for East and West are used since the significance of 
the minimum wage differs widely between the two regions and is likely to exert quite 
different impacts. Differentiating between sole traders and non-sole traders (i.e. firms 
with wage labour) is essential since sole traders are not directly affected by the mini-
mum wage and may thus show very different effects than firms for which the minimum 
wage may be binding. Sole traders are defined as firms with the firm owner being the 
only person engaged in the organisation, all others are non-sole traders. Among the lat-
ter, there might be firms that consist of two firm owners and no wage labour, though 
this is most uncommon in a trade. 
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In section  6, we suggested two measures for the significance of the minimum wage, the 
binding rate and the wage gap. While the former is an indicator for the accumulative 
effect of the minimum wage since the share of workers with a binding minimum wage 
tends to increase along with increased minimum wage levels, the wage gap captures 
short-term cost effects of the introduction and increase of minimum wages. We focus on 
the results for the binding rate, since for competition the accumulative effect of the 
minimum wage as an instrument to raise rivals’ costs is more significant than a short-
term cost increase. Results of the wage gap yield similar though less robust and signifi-
cant results. 
Table 4 shows the estimation results of ordered probit models on firm profitability. The 
binding has a negative though statistically insignificant effect on the profitability of 
West German roofing firms but shows a positive and significant effect for East German 
roofing firms. The effect of the binding rate on profitability of sole traders is insignifi-
cant in both regions. While an insignificant effect for non-sole traders in the West is to 
be expected given the limited significance of the minimum wage in this region, the posi-
tive effect in East Germany suggests that there might indeed be a negative causal impact 
of the minimum wage on the degree of competition in the East German roofing sector - 
as compared to the control group of the plumbing sector - which gives room for higher 
profitability than in the absence of a minimum wage. 
Most of our control variables show the expected result and are statistically significant. 
Larger and older firms generate higher profitability as do unlimited companies and 
firms with higher qualification levels of firm owners. Material prices have a negative 
impact on profitability for non-sole traders but are insignificant for sole traders, which 
is reasonable since the latter rarely do trade in roofing materials. Demand-side variables 
show different results. The average age of buildings exerts a positive impact on profit-
ability which is in line with the significance of repair work as the main business line for 
most roofing and plumbing firms. Since the need for repair work often comes unexpect-
edly for the clients and calls for urgent response, firms tend to be in a favourable nego-
tiation position and are able to enforce higher prices for their services. The change in 
the number of building permits in the regional market has no significant effect on firm 
profitability. This result may indicate that the market segment for new roofs is of lim-
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ited significance for many small firms, and if they engage in this market segment, price 
competition is more severe since roofing and plumbing firms are typically subcontrac-
tors of larger construction firms which may exert buyer power. Demand for solar collec-
tor installation has a positive effect on the profitability of non-sole traders in East Ger-
many, but no effect in the West. 
Table 4: Results of ordered probit modelsa) on firm profitability in the roofing and 
plumbing sector in Germany, 1996 to 2010 
Dependent variable: West Germany East Germany 
Profitability (credit rating) Non-sole traders Sole traders Non-sole traders Sole traders 
Binding rate -0.107 -0.0120 0.110** 0.109 
 (0.0765) (0.180) (0.0443) (0.111) 
Firm size 0.304***  0.299***  
 (0.00650)  (0.0113)  
Firm age 0.269*** 0.289*** 0.292*** 0.252*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00914) (0.00847) (0.0139) 
Unlimited company 0.546*** 0.436*** 0.443*** 0.470*** 
 (0.00908) (0.0199) (0.0157) (0.0334) 
Graduate 0.0214 0.109* 0.0736*** -0.0221 
 (0.0209) (0.0585) (0.0260) (0.0564) 
Master craftsman 0.0804*** 0.0346** 0.0720*** 0.0142 
 (0.00941) (0.0170) (0.0158) (0.0240) 
Journeyman -0.0764*** -0.116*** -0.0426* -0.0882** 
 (0.0133) (0.0245) (0.0221) (0.0379) 
Material prices -0.392*** -0.302 -0.277 0.429 
 (0.106) (0.240) (0.169) (0.315) 
Change in building permits -0.00411 -0.0132 0.00486 0.0340 
 (0.0100) (0.0175) (0.0169) (0.0303) 
Building age 0.293*** 0.349*** 0.611*** 2.253*** 
 (0.0519) (0.107) (0.138) (0.248) 
Solar demand 0.667 -6.318 15.23*** 17.32* 
 (3.949) (7.856) (5.038) (10.34) 
Market share -0.0945 -1.708 0.747* -4.335 
 (0.142) (1.224) (0.391) (4.761) 
Distance to competitor 0.00845** 0.0140* -0.0142** -0.0138 
 (0.00372) (0.00736) (0.00677) (0.0129) 
Change in stock of firmsb) 0.0588 -0.00202 0.128* 0.0651 
 (0.0397) (0.0291) (0.0651) (0.0484) 
Roofing firm -0.123*** -0.214*** -0.169*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0368) (0.0268) (0.0725) 
No. of observations 376,844 106,978 119,724 44,622 
a): Parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses). - b): Change in stock of firms refers to non-sole 
traders only for the models for non-sole traders, and to sole traders only for the models for sole traders. - 
All models include 14 time dummies, 97 dummies for labour market regions and 8 constants for the cate-
gories of the ordered dependent variable. 
*. **, ***: significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. 
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Market structure variables mostly show the expected effects. A firm’s market share 
positively affects profitability for non-sole traders in East Germany but is not significant 
for the other three groups of firms. Firms with a greater distance to their nearest com-
petitor can yield higher profitability in West Germany. The lagged entry rate negatively 
affects profitability of non-sole traders in West Germany, confirming that new firms 
increase competition and reduce profitability of established firms. Note that the entry 
rate in the model for non-sole traders only includes entries by non-sole traders.  
The level of profitability of roofing firms is significantly lower than that of plumbing 
firms, as revealed by the negative coefficient for the roofing firm dummy.  
Estimation results of the models on entry and exit are shown in Table 5 and confirm the 
results of the model on profitability with respect to minimum wage effects. The binding 
rate shows a highly significant negative effect on market entry of non-sole traders in the 
East German roofing sector and a highly positive effect on entry of sole traders in the 
same region. For West Germany, we find no significant effects. Market exit is hardly 
affected by the minimum wage, though we find a weakly significant negative effect on 
the exit rate of non-sole traders in the East. This finding is not very robust, however, as 
the significance level falls below the 10 percent threshold for slightly different model 
specifications. In addition, we do not find a significant negative effect of the minimum 
wage for a firm’s likelihood of exiting the market when running hazard rate models on 
market exit based on the firm-level data set. 
Entry rates in regional markets tend to be lower if average firm size and age of existing 
firms is low and prices for materials go up. Exit rates are also lower if a region’s firm 
population is young. Increasing prices for materials tend to increase the probability of 
sole traders exiting the market both in East and West Germany. Effects of demand vari-
ables on entry rates are mostly insignificant except for the average age of buildings 
which tends to spur entry of sole traders in the East at the expense of entries by non-sole 
traders. A decrease in new building permits raises market exits of non-sole traders in the 
West while there is a negative impact on the change of repair demand on market exits of 
non-sole traders in the East. For some reason, sole traders in the East show higher exit 
rates when repair demand increases. 
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Table 5: Results of Tobit modelsa) on firm entry and exit in the roofing and plumbing sector in Germany, 1996 to 2010 
 Dependent variable: Entry rate Dependent variable: Exit rate 
 West Germany East Germany West Germany East Germany 
 Non-sole traders Sole traders Non-sole traders Sole traders Non-sole traders Sole traders Non-sole traders Sole traders 
Binding rate -0.0339 0.0297 -0.0402*** 0.0248*** 0.0298 -0.0278 -0.0145* -0.00247 
 (0.0274) (0.0221) (0.00776) (0.00663) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.00837) (0.00757) 
Average firm size -0.0000024 -0.00226*** -0.00219*** -0.00227*** 0.000875*** -0.000477 -0.000302 -0.00104 
 (0.000559) (0.000643) (0.000776) (0.000628) (0.000283) (0.000624) (0.000530) (0.000655) 
Average firm age -0.0141*** -0.00907** -0.0148*** -0.00621 -0.0144*** -0.0159*** -0.0266*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.00313) (0.00375) (0.00427) (0.00498) (0.00363) (0.00394) (0.00464) (0.00370) 
Input prices -0.0789* -0.114*** -0.0636 -0.199*** 0.0102 0.0723* 0.0873 0.184*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0411) (0.0535) (0.0581) (0.0437) (0.0431) (0.0683) (0.0554) 
Change in building permits -0.000778 -0.000452 0.00379 0.00626* -0.00677** -0.00141 0.00157 0.000334 
 (0.00284) (0.00249) (0.00299) (0.00343) (0.00269) (0.00226) (0.00561) (0.00408) 
Change in building age -0.210 0.0477 -0.494* 0.299** -0.197 -0.115 -0.421* 0.276*** 
 (0.194) (0.259) (0.253) (0.141) (0.202) (0.258) (0.233) (0.0901) 
Change in solar demand -0.000108 0.000396 0.000433 0.000635 -0.000572 -0.000285 -0.000194 -0.000610** 
 (0.000397) (0.000275) (0.000336) (0.000566) (0.000445) (0.000487) (0.000690) (0.000284) 
Average market share -0.0452*** -0.00555 -0.0121 -0.00615 -0.0468*** -0.0281*** 0.00954 -0.0366*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0100) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.00893) (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0112) 
Average distance to competitor -0.00278*** -0.00178** 0.00165 -0.00712 -0.00459*** -0.00223* -0.00693*** -0.0106*** 
 (0.00101) (0.000756) (0.00231) (0.00445) (0.00107) (0.00114) (0.00222) (0.00271) 
Exit rate (lagged)b) 0.0858***  0.0578      
 (0.0273)  (0.0389)      
Entry rate (lagged)b)     0.0438  -0.0842***  
     (0.0267)  (0.0308)  
Roofing firm 0.00703*** -0.0245*** 0.0283*** -0.0220*** -0.00230 -0.0161*** 0.0163*** -0.000941 
 (0.00258) (0.00298) (0.00332) (0.00413) (0.00272) (0.00316) (0.00386) (0.00430) 
Constant 0.0382*** 0.0355*** 0.0404*** 0.0234* 0.0720*** 0.0272*** 0.0985*** 0.0221*** 
 (0.00857) (0.0100) (0.0118) (0.0131) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0115) (0.00835) 
No. of observations 9,112 9,112 2,436 2,436 9,106 9,106 2,436 2,436 
a): Parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses). - b): Entry and exit rates refer to entries and exits of non-sole traders only for the models for non-sole traders and to 
sole traders only for the models for sole traders. - All models include 14 time dummies and are clustered for labour market regions. 
*. **, ***: significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. 
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A low average market share of firms in a regional market tends to increase exit rates for 
both sole and non-sole traders in the West and for sole traders in the East. There is also 
a negative impact of average market share on entry rates of non-sole traders in the West. 
If firms in a region are located further apart from each other, exit rates are lower, but in 
the West this situation also leads to lower entry rates. A high exit rate of non-sole trad-
ers in the previous years spurs market entries of non-sole traders in West Germany, 
while for the East we find a negative impact of lagged entry rate on market exits of non-
sole traders. Both results support the existence of some sort of “revolving door” effects 
in the roofing and plumbing business. 
Table 6: Results of OLS modelsa) on change in stock of firms in the roofing and 
plumbing sector in Germany, 1996 to 2010  
Dependent variable: West Germany East Germany 
Change in stock of firms Non-sole traders Sole traders Non-sole traders Sole traders 
Binding rate -0.000355 0.0427 -0.0211 0.167*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0757) (0.0152) (0.0422) 
Average firm size -0.000937* -0.00214 0.000259 -0.00292 
 (0.000521) (0.00146) (0.000955) (0.00431) 
Average firm age -0.00818 0.0136* -0.00435 0.0649*** 
 (0.00553) (0.00806) (0.0101) (0.0178) 
Material prices -0.127* -0.159 -0.0821 0.0387 
 (0.0726) (0.185) (0.0731) (0.330) 
Change in building permits -0.000900 -0.00234 0.00806 0.00167 
 (0.00400) (0.0125) (0.00819) (0.0276) 
Change in building age 0.0561 -0.00929 0.118 -0.789 
 (0.151) (0.398) (0.233) (0.686) 
Change in solar demand -0.000195 0.00201 -0.000104 -0.00313 
 (0.000587) (0.00200) (0.00109) (0.00270) 
Average market share 0.0110 -0.0317 -0.0705*** -0.0722 
 (0.0175) (0.0190) (0.0168) (0.0429) 
Average distance to competitor -0.00137 -0.00308** 0.00209 0.00390 
 (0.00104) (0.00136) (0.00514) (0.0145) 
Roofing firm 0.00669** 0.0194** 0.0226** -0.0317 
 (0.00285) (0.00763) (0.00832) (0.0245) 
Constant 0.0301** 0.0191 0.00932 -0.174*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0214) (0.0295) (0.0505) 
No. of observations 9,112 9,106 2,436 2,436 
a): Parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses). - All models include 14 time dummies and 97 
dummies for labour market regions. 
*. **, ***: significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. 
Finally, we look at the impact of minimum wages on changes in the stock of firms 
(Table 6). The estimation results support the findings of the previous models. In East 
Germany, the stock of sole traders in a regional roofing market increases the higher the 
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average binding rate of firms is. For non-sole traders in the East, we find a negative, but 
not statistically significant effect of the binding rate on the stock of firms. The negative 
effect of the minimum wage on both the number of entries and the number of exits of 
sole traders in the East German roofing market go together with a stable stock of firms. 
Again we do not find any statistically significant effects for West Germany.  
Most of our control variables do not work well in the stock-of-firm models and are in-
significant, except for the average age of the firm population in a regional market which 
shows a negative effect. There is a significantly stronger growth of the stock of roofing 
firms compared to plumbing firms.  
The model results show evidence that a strategy of raising rivals’ costs through a mini-
mum wage and by that reducing the degree of competition in the market might in fact 
be at work in the German roofing sector as far as East Germany is concerned. In this 
region, the minimum wage contributed to lower entry rates and a lower stock of firms 
than in the absence of this policy instrument. Lower competition helped the firms to 
reach a level of profitability they otherwise would not have been able to realise. A pre-
condition for higher profitability is the ability of firms to increase prices to compensate 
for higher costs of the minimum wage. Our survey of roofing firms clearly showed that 
most East German firms indeed reacted upon the minimum wage by increasing prices 
which is a clear sign that there is room for price pass-through in the roofing market. 
Unfortunately, there are no regionally differentiated price data for roofing services 
available in Germany that would allow a statistical test. Analysing the impact of the 
minimum wage on prices for roofing services in Germany as a whole shows a small 
positive impact of the average binding rate on the level of prices for roofing services.6 
This result provides further support for price pass-through, particularly as one may only 
expect small effects if any for Germany in total given the limited significance of the 
minimum wage as a cost raising component in West Germany. 
                                                 
6 These results are derived from DiD models that regress the quarterly average binding rate on quarterly 
price data for four different types of roofing and plumber services while controlling for input price devel-
opment and demand development; reference period is second quarter 1996 to second quarter 2009. For 
more details see Aretz et al. (2011). 
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A major finding of this study is that the minimum wage implies different competition 
effects for different types of firms. The above-mentioned impacts only hold for firms 
which employ wage labour. In a trade such as roofing, there is also opportunity for sole 
traders to offer services and run a business, either by focussing on smaller repair work, 
by working together with other sole traders or by serving as subcontractor to other (lar-
ger) roofing firms. Sole traders are not directly affected by the minimum wage since 
only wage labour is subject to the regulation while sole traders are self-employed per-
sons. We find evidence that the minimum wage contributed to a growth in the number 
of sole traders in the East German roofing sector, particularly by stimulating market 
entries. It is difficult to assess whether these market entries represent an evasion strat-
egy of established firms. One could also argue that market entries of sole traders are a 
reaction of more skilled workers in East German roofing firms who are faced with stag-
nating nominal wages as many East German roofing firms tried to compensate for 
higher wage costs due to the minimum wage by saving costs on the side of higher quali-
fied workers whose wages were gradually squeezed towards the minimum wage level 
(see Aretz et al. 2012). While we have no data at hand to directly evaluate the presence 
of an evasion strategy, shifts in the qualification level of sole traders as well as the per-
sistence of remaining a sole trader in the business (and not starting to employ workers) 
may give some hints. The share of roofing journeymen who started a sole trade was 
very low in the first years after the introduction of the minimum wage and increased 
since then both in the West and the East though most recently the share has been higher 
in East Germany (Table 7) which may indicate a reaction to deteriorating wages for 
skilled workers.  
The descriptive statistics show that in the West the survival rate has decreased over time 
in comparison to the period 1994-1997. In East Germany, in contrast, the survival rate 
of sole traders has strongly increased from 58 percent for those who started up during 
the years 1994-1997 to 88 percent in 2006 and is now higher than in the western part of 
Germany. Perhaps in the first few years following reunification the sole traders in East 
Germany were unfamiliar with processes taking place in a market economy, but the 
founders of sole-trade firms have learned to survive and apparently are also highly in-
terested in remaining self-employed.   
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The share of surviving sole traders that remain as such and do not hire additional em-
ployees is lower nowadays in western Germany than it was before the introduction of 
the minimum wage. 30 percent of businesses that started as sole traders in 2006 grew to 
be non-sole traders in 2010 (i.e. they employed other workers). In contrast, the share of 
sole traders who were still sole traders in the fifth year of market presence increased in 
the eastern part of Germany and has been higher than the respective share in West Ger-
many every year since the introduction of the minimum wage. For the most recent us-
able year (2006) the difference between West and East Germany is significant. This 
may indicate a higher relevance of the strategy in Eastern Germany of permanently re-
maining a sole trader . The diverging trends in the two parts of Germany may reflect 
different motives for becoming sole traders. In the West it is most unlikely to be the 
result of evasion as the share of workers covered by the minimum wage is below the 
share of sole traders. In the East, however, evasion may well be the case and the data is 
at least not inconsistent with such an interpretation.  
Table 7: Qualification level and market survival of sole traders in the German 
roofing sector, 1994-2009 
Period of 
business 
start-up 
Share of sole traders with 
journeyman’s certificate in 
the roofing business 
Share of sole traders staying 
in the market 5 years after 
entry 
Share of surviving sole trad-
ers that are still sole traders 
5 years after entry 
 West East West East West East 
‘94-‘97 9.4 23.0 85.5 57.9 77.1 72.4 
‘98-‘01 7.2 4.0 75.7 71.3 58.1 62.7 
‘02-‘05 16.1 11.7 76.4 81.5 61.6 67.5 
‘06-‘09* 14.6 16.6 82.9 87.7 69.8 81.0 
2006 only for the share of sole traders exiting market 5 years after entry and for the share of surviving 
sole traders that are still sole traders 5 years after entry. 
Source: MUP 
8 Conclusions 
This paper analysed the impact of a minimum wage on competition in a particular sec-
tor of the German construction business, the roofing sector. A minimum wage for blue-
collar workers was introduced in this sector in 1997 and has been raised gradually since 
then. The minimum wage is of high significance in eastern Germany, where the regula-
tion is binding for up to 60 percent of all workers while the policy instrument is of lim-
 38
ited relevance in the western part of the country where only about 10 percent of workers 
are affected.  
Our aim was to contribute to the small amount of literature investigating the effects of 
minimum wages for competition. Our study benefited from a broad coverage of firms 
operating in a specific industry and a large diversity of the binding nature of the mini-
mum wage. As required for consistency we only find effects for eastern Germany 
where, in contrast to western Germany, a large proportion of all workers are affected by 
minimum wages. A main advantage and perhaps an innovative element of the present 
study is the use of several control variables on firm characteristics, input costs, devel-
opment of demand and market structure. These variables have a firm foundation in the 
literature and are standard in the analysis of competition.  
We investigated the impact of the minimum wage on four competition indicators: firm 
profitability, market entry, market exit, and stock of firms. We analysed the develop-
ment of the industry over time, which is probably of high relevance for economic wel-
fare. The time period covered by our study is long enough to observe market adjustment 
by exit and entry, which in many cases will only slowly react to changes in market con-
ditions. We focus on the accumulative effect by using the binding rate, that is the share 
of workers for which the minimum wage is binding. If a minimum wage exists for a 
long time and is increased gradually, cost-raising effects of the minimum wage as com-
pared to a situation without a minimum wage tend to increase over time. Such a cost 
increase may particularly hurt potential entrants since in a trade such as roofing newly 
founded firms are typically less productive than established firms owing to a lack of 
scale economies and market experience. In addition, they may suffer from lack of repu-
tation. In many industries, entrants try to compensate for the disadvantage of newness 
by offering lower prices for their services, based on lower production costs, including 
lower wages than established firms. A minimum wage may undermine this strategy. 
From the point of view of established firms, a minimum wage raises rivals’ costs, can 
prevent market entry and reduce the degree of competition. 
Employing a difference-in-difference approach with the plumbing sector as a control 
group and using a 15 year firm panel data set that almost fully covers the firm popula-
tion in both sectors in Germany we find evidence for a competition-reducing effect in 
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the eastern part of the country. Minimum wages contributed to lower entry rates of non-
sole traders (i.e. firms with employees) and a lower number of non-sole traders operat-
ing in the East German roofing market as compared to the hypothetical situation of no 
minimum wage. Exit rates of non-sole traders in East Germany may also be lowered, 
but the robustness of this finding is weak. Minimum wages also led to higher profitabil-
ity for East German non-sole traders than one would have found in the absence of a 
minimum wage. Higher profitability may be associated with lower competition as well 
as the ability of firms to pass through higher costs to customers. The latter may result 
from low price elasticity of demand owing to the fact that roofing services cannot be 
substituted by suppliers from other industries and that customers cannot simply refrain 
from repairing a damaged roof while for new buildings, labour costs of roofers are a 
negligible part of total building costs. 
Another important finding is that the minimum wage spurred the growth of sole traders 
in the East German roofing market. A shift form non-sole to sole traders may indicate 
some type of evasion behaviour since sole traders are not subject to minimum wage 
regulation and often serve as subcontractors for other roofing firms, though many may 
manage to run an independent business based on repair work and co-operation with 
other construction services, e.g. for installing solar collectors. The growing number of 
sole traders in East Germany may also reflect less attractive working conditions for the 
more qualified workers. Aretz et al. (2012) found that the minimum wage not only af-
fected the employment probability of workers with a binding minimum wage nega-
tively, but also of workers paid above the minimum wage level. In addition, the wage 
distribution in East Germany was compressed towards the minimum wage level over 
time, resulting in less opportunity for qualified workers to earn significantly above the 
minimum wage. Some of these qualified workers may have opted to start their own 
business to increase their earnings, particularly since moving out of their region (e.g. to 
move to West Germany, where wage levels for qualified roofing workers are much 
higher) is often seen as no option due to family obligations and ties to property. 
Throughout our analysis we did not find any competition effects of the minimum wage 
for West Germany.  
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As with any study, our analysis has a number of limitations that should be pointed out. 
Unfortunately we were not able to identify the share of workers with a binding mini-
mum wage at the firm level. Instead we use the regional and size class variation in cov-
erage of workers by the minimum wage as indication concerning the relevance of this 
regulation. While we find a rising share of sole traders, we know little about the nature 
of this trend. In particular, we cannot determine whether newly founded sole traders in 
East Germany are the result of an evasion strategy or just induced by the dismissals of 
the non-sole roofing firms. To clarify this, more detailed analysis would be needed, in-
cluding interviews with sole traders about their business strategy. 
Another shortcoming of the study is the neglect of potential spillovers from other con-
struction industries with minimum wages. Most importantly, the main construction 
trade is also subject to a minimum wage which was introduced in January 1997, a few 
months before the roofing minimum wage came effective. Demand for roofing services 
may be affected by changes in prices for buildings that are due to the minimum wage in 
the main construction business, particularly for the market segment of new buildings, 
since roofs are a sub-product of buildings and demand for erecting new roofs is simply a 
derivative of the demand for new buildings.  
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